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11 Summary
Member States have the competence and the obligation to implement and to
enforce Community law. How they do this belongs in principle to their freedom of
policy. During the last few years, however, this policy freedom has been
objectively bound to and completed by Community law, in the form of case law
of the Court of Justice as well as by secondary Community legislation. In this way
a process of harmonisation has come into its stride, which has substantial
consequences for the national enforcement laws.
For some time conventional wisdom was that the criminal law of the Member
States would remain unaffected by Community law. The thinking was that the
Community operated only in the areas set out in the Treaty and there was no
reference in the Treaties to matters of criminal nature; but during the 1970s the
ECJ had made it clear that, while the primary competence in criminal matters
rested with the Member States, Community law sets limits on what the Member
States were free to do.
The impact which Community law has on the Member States  `criminal law has
two aspects. In the first instance, in certain situations Community law requires that
particular parts of a Member State’s criminal law should not be applied.
Additionally, Member States should refrain from adopting measures that
constitute a threat to the realisation of Community objectives.
In other situations, however, the obligation is a positive one whereby the state is
required to impose duties on individuals or other legal persons within its
jurisdiction, duties which might have to be enforced by the state’s criminal law.
The Member States must in particular ensure that violations of Community Law
are sanctioned according to conditions of content and procedure which are
analogous to those that apply to violations of national law of a similar nature and
importance, and which render the sanctions effective, proportionate and of a
deterrent nature. To apply sanctions under analogous conditions entails the
application of the assimilation principle.
Duties are imposed on individuals by EC law in a number of ways, for example
through Treaty Articles. It is possible for regulations to impose duties directly on
individuals but also to impose a duty on the states to adopt measures to ensure
compliance by individuals. Directives, on the other hand, always require action to
be taken by the Member States to achieve goals set in the directive. A directive
sets the objectives to be achieved and leaves the choice of implementing methods
to the states, but this could include an obligation to be imposed on legal persons
within that state.
2The Treaty of Amsterdam has made some changes. Art.29 II No.3 TEU,
mentioning for the first time criminal matters, contains the approximation of rules
on criminal matters in the Member States. This approximation could happen
through Art.31 (e) TEU by progressively adopting measures establishing minimum
rules, for example in the way of framework decisions, Art.34 (b) TEU.
Furthermore, Art.209A ECT was changed in to Art.280 ECT, which now
contains a Art.280 IV, stating that the Council shall adopt the necessary measures
in the fields of the prevention of and fight against fraud affecting the financial
interests of the Community. This constitutes for the first time a competence for the
Community in criminal matters, even though the range, which Art.280 IV covers,
is disputed. Some may argue that Art.280 IV contains a criminal competence to
inflict penal sanctions, others say that it only confirms the competence of the
Community to impose administrative sanctions.
On the basis of Art.280 IV, the EC has issued a directive on the criminal law
protection of the Community’s financial interests.
There is little doubt that Europeanization is making headway now in the field of
criminal justice. Some provisions of the Union Treaty (like Art.29, 31, 34 TEU)
are at least an indication of the forces which are likely to shape future
developments. There exist different possible lines of development: more intensive
co-operation, assimilation and harmonisation, for example in the form of a model
penal code or in form of the proposed Corpus Juris.
They all have their weaknesses.
Co-operation faces first of all the problem that conventions need ratification and
experience from the past shows that many States hesitates in ratifying them.
Assimilation does not guarantee effectiveness and does not solve the problem of
cross-border crime. The criminal rules in the different Member States can still
continue to be very different and thereby create oasis for criminals, who pick the
States with the smallest punishment.
Harmonisation faces beside others first of the entire problem that there exists a
risk that the Member States would loose their national identity and that they could
only agree on the smallest common denominator. That would bear the danger that
entrenched guarantees would get lost.
The European Council held a special meeting on 15 and 16 October 1999 in
Tampere on the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice in the
European Union. Because criminals must find no way of exploiting differences in
the judicial systems of Member States, it was proposed that a unit “Eurojust“
should be established. On 19 July 2000 the Council of the European Union
decided to set up Eurojust as a network of judges, prosecutors, magistrates and
national policemen that will facilitate the exchange of information and the co-
3ordination among judicial systems in criminal prosecutions and even in civil
processes.
Furthermore it should be observed that the Commission proposed the creation of
a European Public Prosecutor as a supranational institution. It presented a green
book considering the possible advantages.
4Abbreviations
Art. Article
DG Directorate General
EC European Community
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights
ECJ European Court of Justice
EEC European Economic Community
ECT Treaty of the European Community
EJN European Judicial Network
EPP European Public Prosecutor
EU European Union
Europol European Police Office
JA Juristische Arbeitsschriften
JZ Juristen Zeitung
NJW Neue Juristische Wochenschrift
NStZ Neue Strafrechtszeitung
OLAF Office européen de lutte anti-fraude
TEU Treaty of the European Union
UCLAF Unité de coordination de lutte antifraude
ZStW Zeitschrift für die gesamte 
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52 Introduction
All EC Member States have a system of criminal law. On the whole, this criminal
law has come about at the initiative from the Member States themselves.
Sometimes the penal provisions have been made in order to carry out an
obligation imposed by the EC. As a result of the increasing economic integration
within the EC, the differences between national systems of criminal law may lead
to problems in the near future. It can be observed, that even in those areas of
criminal activity that are of equal concern to all Member States, the legislation and
specific practices of each one demonstrate a variety of approaches.1
At the time of its establishment, the Community did not wish to cover criminal
law. Therefore, criminal law was left outside the scope of the EEC, and remained
within the sovereign jurisdiction of the Member States. So the EC has no
competence regarding criminal law.2 The Community, itself without authority in
criminal matters, is dependent on national legislation and enforcement practice.3
Not least because of its perceived significance as an essential badge of
sovereignty, criminal law and justice is often cited as the paradigm example of an
area of activity that is exempt from the penetrating forces of Community law.4
However, it soon turned out that the view that Community law would not affect
national criminal law was not tenable. Both the Treaties and secondary
Community law are sources of obligations on the Member States in the sphere of
criminal law.5 The discussion concerns the emergence of a “European criminal law
space“ and the impact of European law (of various kinds) on national criminal law
and criminal justice. The problem is the rapidly developing, expanding and
increasingly sophisticated “European crime space“, contrasted with a much less
developed and effective “European criminal law space“.6
This essay will analyse the current situation and try to answer the question if there
exists a “European Criminal Law“ and if the Community is aiming towards a
European criminal law space. It will focus on the question of harmonisation and
give an outlook for the future in regard to the proposal of an EPP.
One main aspect will be the fraudulent activities regarding the financial interests of
the EC. The budget, defined as “the visible sign of a true patrimony common to
citizens of the Union“, is the supreme instrument of European policy. To say this
emphasises the extreme seriousness of any crime which undermines this
                                                
1http://www.euroscep.dircon.co.uk/corpus6.htm
2Eisele, page 991
3Vervaele, page 183
4Baker, page 361
5Sevenster, page 29
6Harding MJ, page 224
6patrimony.7 Criminal justice in this area comes up against obstacles pertaining
both to the lack of continuity in criminal procedure (criminal justice authorities
usually being competent only within national borders) and to the disparity of the
legal systems. If the same offences are differently punished in different Member
States, then the forbidden activity will move to the State with the lowest
punishment and thereby distort the international competition situation.8 It is absurd
that the borders are open for criminals but closed for the prosecution.9
As a result of the modern information systems it does not matter anymore where
the criminals are situated geographically. In a society that is based on the
principles of the free movement, even traditional law offences gain an international
dimension.10 Lawbreakers do not think in geographical terms, but their clever
legal advisers do, who point out specific offences and perpetrators, often in
advance, and the gaps and deficiencies in the existing international agreements.11
                                                
7Delmas-Marty 1997, page 13
8Sieber 1993, page 795
9Zieschank, page 262
10Sieber 1997, page 370
11Schomburg, page 52
73 Criminal law in the EU
3.1 Criminal competence of the EC
3.1.1 no criminal competence of the EC
There is neither Community criminal law nor a Community law of criminal
proceedings. There are no penal sanctions at EC-level and there is no Community
criminal investigation and prosecution. The lacking competence comprises the
jurisdiction to prescribe as well as the jurisdiction to enforce.12 For the
enforcement of its laws by means of punishment, the Community is dependent on
the Member States.13 The Member States did not give up their sovereignty
regarding criminal law.14 This arises in part from the inevitable relation between
the need for state security and the protection of other important national interests
and the availability of criminal law as an obvious means of guaranteeing such
interests; in part from the culturally specific character of some crime and the
nationally specific thrust of much policy formulated to deal with crime problems.15
The case law of the ECJ confirms that criminal law is generally up to the Member
States.16
It is obvious that this decision is mainly political.17 But there are also legal
considerations.
Criminal law is very closely connected to the State. It influences and limits the
sphere of freedom of the citizens and therefore needs very strict democratic
protection. The democratically legitimated enforcement of penal repression as
well as the guarantee principles of criminal law is forms of its function as a
measure of the citizen’s freedom, besides its obvious function as a measure of
protection for social goods.18 Considering the effect that criminal sanctions of the
Community would have on the rights of individuals should have been expressly
provided for in the Treaty.19 Criminal law demands democratic legitimacy, which
the EC has not reached yet.20 The Community does not have an institution, which
would be comparable to the national parliaments. Purely parliamentarian
                                                
12Tiedemann, page 24
13Sevenster, page 31
14Dannecker, page 869
15Harding/ Swart, page 87
16Bickel vs Franz, C-274/96
  Donatella Calfa, C-348/96
   Lemmens, C-226/97
17Musil, page 69
18Kaiafa-Gbandi, page 242
19Biancarelli, page 262
20Dannecker, page 869
8legislation is naturally strange to the EC as an international organisation.21 The
Council, the legislative organ of the Community, is composed of representatives
of the executive and not directly democratically legitimated.22
It is sometimes stated that these considerations are only valid regarding a
competence to create direct supranational sanctions. Apart from that, the EC can
force Member States to implement national laws through regulations or directives.
Directives are only aimed at the Member State and the resulting law after the
implementation contains the direct democratic legitimacy of the national
legislator.23
This argument can be considered as misleading because it does not at all answer
the question whether the Community has foremost competence to enact
directives, which enforce the undertaking of penal measures, and whether such
directives could consequently be binding upon the Member States. An obligation
for the national legislator to incriminate an activity - with a specific content- cannot
be held valid as long as the subject imposing it has no relevant competence.
Furthermore it should be noted that the standards for the legitimisation of criminal
law are taken out of the national constitutions, which are for example the
principles of retroactivity and analogy.24 The EC has no constitution; the
protection of individuals is not strong enough. This was recognised which can be
proved by giving regard to the discussion around the draft charter of fundamental
rights. The ECHR cannot replace a constitution, especially since the EU cannot
join the ECHR yet25 and is thereby no addressee of the ECHR. The principles of
the ECHR need the judicial protection of the ECJ.26
3.1.2 Influence of EC law on criminal law
That the EC has no competence in criminal matters does not mean that the
Member States are completely free to decide if or how they carry out
enforcement. The Member States have enforcement duties under the Treaty.27 It
has to be noticed that the national criminal law has become more and more
“European“. The strong influence of the EC law also on the criminal law of the
Member States cannot be denied.28 The Treaty of Amsterdam allows for that
fact, for example by introducing Art.280 IV ECT and Art.29II Nr.3 in connection
with Art.31(e) TEU.
                                                
21Musil, page 70
22Sieber 1991, page 970
23Sieber 1991, page 972
24Braum, page 498
25Opinion 2/94 of 28 March 1996
26Braum, page 498
27Vervaele, page 183
28Zieschank, page 256
9The fact that it is no longer possible for Member States to determine their criminal
law without reference to Community law became apparent as individuals began to
resist the application of Member States criminal law by relying on Community
grounds.29
3.2 The Council of Europe
The Council of Europe operates on an intergovernmental basis and its crime
control instruments take the form of treaties to which its Member States may
choose to accede.30 The Institutions of the Council of Europe have worked on all
aspects of criminal law, including constitutional law and human rights, material and
procedural rights and international co-operation.31 The Council of Europe has
concluded 20 conventions, which are relevant for criminal law. Between these,
the European Convention on Extradition of December 13, 1957, followed by two
additional protocols in 1975 and 1978 and the European Convention on Judicial
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters of April 20, 1959 and its additional
protocol of 1978 occupies central significance.32 Almost all Member States of the
Council of Europe signed these conventions. Also environmental protection is
covered through the Convention on the Protection of the Environment through
Criminal Law from 1998. Especially in this field international co-operation is very
difficult and the danger of trans-border offences extremely high;33 but it should not
be concealed that the Member States partly hesitate to ratify the conventions. The
European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgements in
Criminal Cases of May 28, 197034 is only ratified by 10 States;35 the 1978
protocol (on facilitating mutual assistance in fiscal matters) is not yet ratified by
one Member State.36
The impact of the ECHR on the operation of national criminal justice has long
been a fact of life for criminal lawyers in a number of European Countries, and
other European Council instruments have had an increasing impact on procedural
and penal matters.37 Today, the ECHR guarantees elementary procedural rights
all over Europe.38 It ranks now as one of the most developed international
regimes for the protection of the rights of individuals and groups. In terms of crime
control, however, it acts as a brake rather than to facilitate enforcement, in that it
has set more rigorous limits on the exercise of state powers of law enforcement.
But although in one sense it may thus be seen as a hurdle to enforcement of
                                                
29Guldenmund..., page 108
30Harding MJ, page 229
31Sieber 1997, page 371
32Schübel, page 106
33Sieber 1997, page 371
34ETS No.70 in Bassiouni, page 625
35Jung, page 418/419
36Official Journal, C-216 01/08/2001 p.0014-0026
37Harding ELR, page 374
38Sieber 1997, page 371
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criminal law, on another view it has added to the vitality of such processes by
reinforcing respect and confidence in criminal justice systems, so that there may
well be a longer-term profit from the enforcement perspective.39
Sub-regional or bilateral conventions in between the EU (as for example the
Schengen agreement) are no substitute for the conventions of the Council of
Europe but they supplement them.
3.3 The 3rd pillar
A possibility to protect Community interests, even though the EC lacks
competence in criminal matters, is the conclusion of international contracts or
conventions in the framework of the 3rd pillar. The outcome is not Community
law in the common sense but international law.40 These treaties or conventions will
be traditional international law agreements, enforceable as international treaties
but not through any central organisational mechanism.41
3.3.1 Intergovernmental Method
The term intergovernmental connotes a structure of co-operation and common
decision-making, which enables the participants to retain sovereignty. Practical
legal co-operation in the wider sense rests primarily on an even-tighter network of
multilateral agreements, on “small-scale“ legal co-operation in the stricter sense,
on extradition, on the transfer of proceedings or judgements and on the transfer of
convicted persons.42
An EC agreement has been drawn up for the mutual recognition of criminal
sentences (the so-called Ne-bis Treaty).43 A second EC agreement concerns the
application among Member States of the Council of Europe Treaty on the
transport of sentenced persons. Furthermore there is the EC agreement
concerning the application among Member States on the European Treaty for the
Combat of Terrorism.44 These agreements require the use of national criminal law
in a certain way to deal with mutual problems involving transnational criminality.
There is thus, in fact, a firmly established practice of international intrusion into the
sphere of national criminal law in order to achieve certain common multinational
objectives.45
Most of the existing treaties originated within the Council of Europe. To some
extent there is already an overlap: for instance, the respective Council of Europe
                                                
39Harding MJ, page 230
40Eisele, page 991
41Harding MJ, page 334
42Schomburg, page 52
43http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/CadreListeTraites.htm
44Official Journal C-178, 02/08/1976 p.0030
45Harding ELR, page 380/381
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Convention and the EC Directive on money laundering cover similar ground and
use similar terminology; there is a Council of Europe Convention on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters and also now a proposed EU Convention on the
same.46
It is sometimes submitted that Member States sovereignty has a better guarantee
in the framework of the Council of Europe, because there no supranational law is
made. This type of co-operation in the sphere of international legal assistance is
not as far-reaching as the substantive adjustments that the Commission has in
mind.47 But today, the efforts for unification of European criminal law are no
longer pursued in the Council of Europe. This kind of law is too dependent on
national tradition.48
3.3.2 Problems
The system introduced within the third pillar basically suffered from the following
problems: conventions may not come into force within a reasonable period of time
for lack of ratification. As a result of the fact that it has not been possible to create
a proper synergy between the European Parliament and the national parliaments,
joint operations are reduced. The instruments adopted do not include any
appropriate follow-up measures.49 There exists no unitary legal assistance
agreement, which would settle the basic questions once and for all in a general
section and deal with special instruments in a special section.
Some Member States may delay significantly to ratify such a convention.
Apart from that Member States may express reservations and exempt themselves
from different regulations causing lacunas again in the intended form of
protection.50
And thirdly, even in respect of that to which states have committed themselves,
there is no strong accountability for any breach of obligation.51 There is at present
little opportunity for judicial scrutiny and individual challenge of third pillar
measures compared to the way in which Community instruments may be
reviewed or interpreted by the ECJ. There has been some feeling that the
operational culture of third pillar activity enables policies to be worked out and
even implemented with little transparency and accountability.52
Another problem area is the lack of a uniform interpretation of the conventions
themselves in the various Contracting States.
                                                
46Harding MJ, page 333
47Sevenster, page 37/38
48Oehler, page 613
49http://www.euroscep.dircon.co.uk/corpus6.htm 19.11.2001
50Kaiafa-Gbandi, page 246
51Harding MJ, page 335
52Harding MJ, page 337
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There is the additional complication that already the initial remedial measures will
produce new problems: on the basis of Article 35 TEU the European Court of
Justice will at last also be able to deliver preliminary rulings on the interpretation of
the conventions under Title VI (police and judicial co-operation). However: this
instrument is only available to those States and between those States which have
recognised this jurisdiction in accordance with Article 35 (2) TEU.53
Furthermore, there will be no getting away from inconsistencies as a result of
language barriers.
Not to forget, the process of negotiations and adoption of international
agreements to harmonise substantive laws and procedures is notoriously slow.
The system of negotiations involves governments and ratification by national
parliaments is needed as well. This is a democratic and therefore slow process.54
3.3.3 Most important 3rd pillar acquis regarding fraud
The budged, defined as the “visible sign of a true patrimony common to citizens of
the Union“, is the supreme instrument of European policy. To say this emphasises
the extreme seriousness of any crime which undermines this patrimony.55
Fraud against the EC is fraud against the flow of funds to and from the
Community budget.56 It occurs in a variety of ways, normally involving either non-
payment of tax or duties or unjustified receipt of subsidies. The impact of fraud is
both direct, in terms of loss of national revenue and indirect, as Community
policies are distorted and do not achieve their intended aims.57 It is generally
agreed that substantial difficulties exist in prosecuting frauds against Community
funds in national courts. National criminal laws and procedures are essentially
territorial in scope. Problems may arise by virtue of the absence of or differences
in, substantive criminal laws, rules of evidence, or procedural rules. Furthermore,
elements of the crime are committed in various Member States and no national
authority has complete jurisdiction. Not all Member States have laws, which
enable such frauds to be prosecuted extraterritorially. Apart from that, the legal
mechanisms for collecting evidence from other jurisdictions are ineffective and
outdated.58
Some steps are taken in preventing fraudulent activities.
The most important acquis to be mentioned here are:
                                                
53Schomburg, page 55
54Nilsson, page 326
55Delmas-Marty 1997, page 13
56Vervaele, page 184
57Bell, page 154/155
58Nilsson, page 326
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1. Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European
Union, on the Protection of the European Communities` financial interests59(the
PIF Convention)
2. Protocol drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European
Union to the Convention on the protection of the European Communities´
financial interests- Statements made by Member States on the adoption of the
Act drawing up the Protocol60
3. Council Act of 29 November 1996 drawing up, on the basis of Article K.3 of
the Treaty on the European Union, the Protocol on the interpretation, by the
way of preliminary rulings, by the ECJ of the Convention on the protection of
the European Communities  ´financial interests61
4. Second Protocol, drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the treaty on
European Union, to the Convention on the protection of the European
Communities´ financial interests- Joint Declaration on Article 13 (2)-
Commission Declaration on Article 762
The PIF convention establishes a common definition of fraud and requires all
Member States to treat the offences meeting this definition as criminal offences
punishable by criminal penalties, including custodial sentences for serious cases. It
further includes provisions to ensure that rules on jurisdiction and extradition
between Member States cannot provide loopholes to avoid prosecution for fraud
while placing Member States under an obligation to cooperate in the fields of
criminal investigation, prosecution and sanction of fraud. In the two protocols to
the Convention further agreement was reached on a common definition of
corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of the
Member States (first protocol) as well as on other subjects, such as money
laundering and confiscation of proceeds of fraud (second protocol).
The methods that were chosen for harmonisation of the penal repression in the
fields where this happened were not the same. As it has just been shown, in the
case of fraud against the EC financial interests, the step to harmonisation was
made the classical instrument of international co-operation, namely with a
convention. In the case of money laundering, the relevant attempt took place in
the form of a directive.63
3.3.4 From “horizontal“ to “vertical“
There has been a development from the horizontal co-operation between
Member States towards a verticalisation of the fight against EC fraud. The
adoption of the PIF Convention and the two Protocols harmonising the definition
                                                
59Official Journal C-316, 27/11/1995 p.0049-0057
60Official Journal C-313, 23/10/1996 p.0002-0010
61Official Journal C-151, 20/05/1997 p.0001-0014
62Offical Journal C-221, 19/07/1997 p.0012-0022
63Kaiafa-Gbandi, page 245/246
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of the offence of fraud against the financial interests of the EC marked a significant
step in the direction of legislative co-ordination. All Member States however have
not ratified the Convention.64
3.3.5 UCLAF, OLAF and Europol
The primary level of Community intervention is enacting national criminal
legislation for the purpose of harmonisation- as we have seen above.
Another instrument to tackle fraud was the establishment of UCLAF, which
became operational in July 1988. It belongs to the secondary level of the function
of common coordinative organs for a harmonised implementation of penal
repression related to certain crimes over the EU. Although UCLAF has been
developed into an autonomous task force, it has no independent criminal
investigative powers. Investigation and prosecution remain matters for national
authorities, although UCLAF may be able to obtain assistance by exerting
political pressure. On the other hand, UCLAF plays an important role in co-
ordinating anti-fraud activities, both in the Member States as well as in some of
the applicant States.65 Confronted with many still existing gaps, it was finally
decided to enhance the role of UCLAF, now to be called OLAF, and to increase
its independence.
OLAF was established by Commission Decision of 28 April 1998 and came into
being on 1 June 1999. The office was empowered to exercise the Commission’s
powers to carry out external administrative investigations for the purpose of
strengthening the fight against fraud, corruption and any other illegal activity
adversely affecting the Community’s financial interests, as well as any other act by
operators in breach of Community provisions. The Office was further empowered
to carry out internal administrative investigations to combat activities as specified
above as well as to investigate breaches of obligations by officials and servants of
the Communities (and similar breaches by Members of the institutions) which are
likely to lead to disciplinary and criminal proceedings. The Office shall exercise its
powers in complete independence.66
Another important institution on the secondary level is Europol. Europol, which
has been operational since 1998, having replaced the Unit for Combating Drugs,
has nowadays a broader crime co-ordinating role facilitating exchange of
information collection, analysis and provision of information and intelligence
support for national investigations and maintenance of computerised information.
It constitutes in other words a supranational organ with competence in the whole
EU, explicitly active in the field of penal matters but with no self-executive
                                                
64http://www.era.int/domains/corpus-juris/public/main/about.htm
65Nuutila, page 178
66van Gerven, page301/302
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powers. Europol is held, together with OLAF, as the first step of institutions
necessary for the development of a common space of freedom, security and
justice.67
3.3.6 Court of Auditors
Whether or not the internal control is working optimally is determined by the
Court of Auditors, responsible for supervising the Community budget, the
collection as well as the payment side. It examines both the legality and the
legitimacy of revenue and expenditure, and sees whether or not finances have
been well managed. The Court of Auditors also has the power to check on the
use of Community finances (subsidies, interventions, etc.). In its annual reports,
the Court of Auditors rakes both the European Commission and the Member
States over the coals for their practical application of internal control.68
3.3.7 Problems specifically regarding fraud
Additionally to the problems co-operation is facing, a specific problem in relation
to fraud can be mentioned here. Traditional co-operation, aimed more at
individuals than at criminal organisations and with a bilateral rather than multilateral
context in mind, seems ill suited to the type of Community fraud we are facing
today. This type of fraud seems to require horizontal co-operation being dropped
in favour of verticalisation of procedure at the expense of the Community
institutions.69
3.4 The 1st pillar
As already stated above, both the Treaties and secondary Community law are
sources of obligations on the Member States in the sphere of criminal law.70 In
principle, no criminal justice provision is immune from Community law influence
because the supremacy of the latter ensures that it takes precedence where it is in
conflict with domestic law.71
A direct influence of EC law on national criminal law exists first in a negative
respect: the national legislator is not allowed to legislate against Community law.72
For instance, he has to limit the extent of penalties in the interest of the free
movement of persons.73 That means that, because of Community law, the
                                                
67Kaiafa-Gbandi, page 252/253
68Vervaele, page 185/186
69Delmas-Marty 1997, page 26
70Sevenster, page 29
71Baker, page 363
72Tiedemann, page 25
73Conegate vs HM Customs..., C-121/85
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Member States can have the duty to change or even eliminate national criminal
law.74
Positively requiring the use of criminal law for purposes of implementing EC
policies or enforcing Community rights is potentially more significant, but in fact
fits into a wider and more established pattern of directed use of national criminal
law in order to achieve agreed international goals. This can mean that new duties
for citizens and administration are established.75 International treaties have
sometimes required signatory states to use criminal law in certain ways to deal
with mutual problems involving transnational criminality, but this is more a question
of the 3rd pillar.
3.4.1 Sanctions under EC law
3.4.1.1 Supranational sanctions
The contracting parties of the EC have given the EC no competence regarding
criminal law. This follows clearly from a regulation which allows the Community to
impose punitive measures: Art. 15 of Regulation 17/196276 allows the infliction of
fines, but it states in the 4th paragraph that “decisions taken pursuant to
paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not be of a criminal law nature“. These fines are
administrative fines. This means that the Community can punish offences
independently with sanctions, even if this action can be considered as quasi-
criminal-law.77 This shows that, although penal sanctions are absent, other
penalties do exist.
This kind of sanctions is first of all found in the area of competition law on a civil
law level: Art. 81 (2) ECT provides the example of nullity of prohibited
agreements. The prohibitary rules of Art.81 and 82 ECT create in effect
“offences“ and are dealt with as such through the exercise of powers on the part
of EC bodies. Breaches of these articles are investigated and penalised by the
European Commission (the Competition DG) exercising powers laid down in
Regulation 17/1962. The supranational prosecution causes national and
supranational double procedures and problems with the principle “ne bis in
idem“.78
As already stated, any penalties imposed in this context are categorically stated
not to be of a criminal nature and the ECJ has affirmed that the Commission’s
procedure is “administrative“ and not a criminal proceeding.79
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On the other hand, there can be little doubt that in substance these administrative
penalties have strong analogies with criminal law process.80 They can be
extremely high- up until one million Euro and furthermore up until 10% of the last
years turnover of a company;81 but in the case Germany vs Commission82 the
General Advocate draws attention to the fact that typically, the purpose of a
criminal sanction exceeds that of simple deterrence, and will normally involve such
matters as the stigma of social disapproval or moral condemnation. Thus, “the
amount of the penalty, in a criminal case, will often reflect the extent of society’s
disapproval of the conduct in question, rather than any more pragmatic
consideration. In contrast, in the case of a non-penal sanction, even one imposed
in the event of negligence or fraud, the judgement of fault may indeed be a
necessary presupposition, but it is not usually the ultimate purpose of the penalty.
When it is a question, for example, of civil indemnification based on negligence or
fraud, the objective pursued by the penalty is to compensate the victim and,
sometimes, to dissuade the perpetrator of the wring, but not to stigmatise a
criminal act, even if it may be necessary to determine responsibility before
inflicting punishment.”83
The EC competition offences are the kind of Community law, which most
obviously look like criminal offences in the usual sense of the term. But there are
other examples of EC administrative offences and sanctions. In the context of
agricultural regulation, for example, fraudulent declarations were penalised by the
imposition of surcharges or exclusion from subsidies.84 These sanctions were
legally based on Art.34 (2) ECT. The ECJ confirmed that the Community has
competence in this area and stated further that these sanctions are of
administrative and not penal character.85 The case law of the ECJ shows that
penalties imposed by the Community may take various forms.86 Admittedly,
Member State authorities ultimately apply such sanctions, but they are provided
for and determined at the Community level.
Further examples of this kind of Community-level administrative penalty can be
found in the fisheries sector, in the situation where the Commission may refuse the
issue a fishing licence and in the administration of European Social Fund
payments.87
Some case law of the ECJ points in the direction that they recognised the quasi-
penal character of certain sanctions but the ECJ never admitted a criminal
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character. In the Maizena case88 the Court expressed itself most clearly on the
problem of whether it is appropriate to recognise a Community regulation
requiring the repayment of a released deposit as criminal in character when it is
evident that the obligation subscribed to was not performed during the period
covered by the deposit. The ECJ observed that under such conditions, the
repayment of a deposit already released, “ceases to be guarantee and becomes a
penalty when the undertaking has not been complied with and no longer can be
complied with“. The Court underscored that, “thus in a system involving advance
release of a security, the penalty constitutes the corollary of the system of security
and is intended to achieve the same objectives as the security itself.“ Having said
that this sanction is inflicted as forfeiture, the Court concluded that: “it is therefore
an integral part of the system of security at issue and is not criminal in nature.“
Even if the sanctions that are imposed are only administrative, the actual impact of
such sanctions should not be underestimated and those subject to these measures
of control might raise legal protection arguments, which usually apply to criminal
proceedings.
This represents the evolution of a significant supranational system of enforcement
and sanctions, but has so far rarely attracted the attention of criminal lawyers; yet
it amounts to a “ghost“ system of criminal law at the supranational level.89
3.4.1.2 The influence of EC law on national sanctions
The principle points of contact between Community law and national criminal
justice systems arise through the jurisdiction of the ECJ and, secondly, through
legislation.
3.4.1.2.1 The EC Treaty
There is one Treaty clause that does refer to the national criminal law of the
Member States in order to prosecute what one could call a Community offence.
Contrary to what one might expect, this criminal law does not concern economic
delicts. It concerns Art.194 (1) Euratom, on the obligation of professional
secrecy. This article imposes a duty on each Member State to treat an
infringement of this obligation as falling within its jurisdiction, and therefore to
prosecute the civil servant in question.
Furthermore, Art.3 and 27 of the Statute of the ECJ, concerning the prosecution
of judges, and that of witnesses and experts, are relevant. The latter provision
uses the same formula as Art.194 Euratom: the Member States shall treat an
offence as if it had been committed before one of its own courts.
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National provisions imposing penal sanctions can infringe Art.28 ECT, for
example if they lay a heavy burden of proof on the importer concerning the
lawfulness of his importations and impose a penal sanction on this duty.90
Infringements of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide
services may occur.91 It is clear that national legislation, which infringes the Treaty,
is incompatible with the Treaty and that in this respect criminal law forms no
exception. In other words: provisions of national law imposing penal sanctions
must take account of the aims and objectives of the Treaty and may form no
barrier to their realisation.
3.4.1.2.2 The ECJ
As was stated right above, the ECJ had made it clear that, while the primary
competence in criminal matters rests within the Member States, Community law
sets limits on what the Member States are free to do.92
The ECJ has developed a body of fundamental principles that shape its
jurisprudence, a number of which touches upon issues of central concern to
criminal lawyers. For instance, both substantive criminal laws and sentencing
provisions have been held to infringe the fundamental principle of proportionality
and, thus, to be incompatible with Community law. Even if an obligation is in itself
compatible with the Treaty, disproportionality in the implementation (forms and
methods) can lead to a conflict with EC law. Disproportional measures and
sanctions are considered as measures having an equivalent effect to quantitative
restrictions in the sense of Art.28 ECT.93 Since Community law is supreme over
national law,94 this means that proportionality is a valuable tool for checking the
coercive powers of the Member States.95
Furthermore, the Member States are obliged to provide a system of enforcement
that guarantees efficiency, effectiveness, proportionality (as stated above) and
deterrence.96 Art.280 of the Amsterdam Treaty confirmed that.97
Apart from the principle of proportionality, the principle of non-discrimination also
effects the law of criminal proceeding. In the Milchkontor case, the Court said
that “the rules and procedures laid down by national law must not have the effect
of making it virtually impossible to implement Community regulations and national
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legislation must be applied in a manner which is not discriminatory compared to
procedures for deciding similar but purely national disputes“.98
The most celebrated example of a tangible Community law criminal justice
principle authored by the Court resulted from the decision in Commission vs
Greece99, better known as the Greek Maize case.
The Greek Government had failed to take steps to deal with a conspiracy
fraudulently to evade Community import levies on consignments of maize, even
though the Commission had provided evidence that it was being perpetrated with
the collusion of Greek officials. The Court held this to be a breach of the
obligation under Article 5 (now Art.10) ECT to guarantee the application and
effectiveness of Community law and composed the following important principles
for the imposition of penalties under Community law:
“Whilst the choice of penalties remains within (the) discretion (of the Member
States), they must ensure... that infringements of Community law are penalised
under conditions, both procedural and substantive, which are analogous to those
applicable to infringements of national law of a similar nature and importance and
which, in any event, make the penalty effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
Moreover, the national authorities must proceed, with respect to infringements of
Community law, with the same diligence as that which they bring to bear in
implementing corresponding national laws.“100
These remarks proscribe adverse discrimination in the enforcement of Community
law in comparison with that of equivalent domestic law. This “principle of
assimilation“, as applied to abuse of the Community budget, was codified by the
Maastricht Treaty101 and further strengthened in the Treaty of Amsterdam,102
providing a nice example of what the Court can achieve when its ruling resonate
with the political agenda; but the real importance of Greek Maize lies in the fact
that both the principle of assimilation and the prescription for the objective of
penalties have been allocated a place amongst the general principles applied by
the Court.103 The response to the ruling in this case shows that Community law
can have a real impact upon the criminal justice systems of the Member States.
In a general way, one could argue that the ECJ, implicitly but necessarily, even
recognised the existence of a Community sanction power in its decision in
Amsterdam Bulb104, where the Court decided that, “in absence of any provision
in the Community rules providing for specific sanctions to be imposed on
individuals for a failure to observe those rules, the Member States are competent
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to adopt such sanctions as appear to them to be appropriate.“105 This decision
was upheld in even clearer terms in the Greek Maize case, where the ECJ
concluded that, where Community legislation does not specifically provide any
penalty for an infringement or refers for that purpose to national laws, regulations
and administrative provisions, Art.5 (now Art.10) of the Treaty requires the
Member State to take all measures necessary to guarantee the application and
effectiveness of Community law.
As can be seen, Member States criminal law has been adapted to serve
Community interests, and the ECJ has enunciated guiding principles of criminal
law enforcement in this context.
3.4.1.2.3 Regulations
Regulations sometimes refer to national law for the imposition of sanctions.
In a number of cases there exists a division of work between the Member States
and the EC. The Member State constitutes the sanction but regarding the
substantive law it refers to an EC regulation.106 A known example is fraud in
regard to subsidies. The operation of the Community in this field has been the
result of laxity of the Member States for an effective penal protection of its
goods.107
Few regulations contain penalty provisions themselves. One example is Art.8 (1)
of the regulation on financing of the Common Agricultural Policy, which says that
Member States must ensure the prosecution of irregularities and the reclamation
of the sums of money lost.108
It can be observed that there exists a tendency that the Community does not only
prescribe the necessary measures any more, but imposes- partly very detailed-
duties to inflict sanctions.109
The transition of the Community towards an intervention in enacting national penal
provisions of a specific content constitutes qualitatively a very advanced step of
the EC engagement in the field of penal repression. This step can be explained
historically because of the efforts of the ECJ to present the sanctions of the
different regulations as „administrative fines“ despite their more or less obvious
penal function, in order to overcome by this way the obstacle of the missing
criminal competence.110
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3.4.1.2.4  Directives
Up until now the Community mostly used an indirect way to protect its own
interests: it obliged the Member States through directives to punish certain
offences and left it up to the national legislator, if he wanted to use penal or
administrative sanctions.111 That the Community posses this kind of competence is
accepted.112
Directives leave the choice of forms and methods for achieving the desired results
up to Member States (Art.249 ECT). Sanctions will therefore never be included
in a directive. Some directives113 show that the competence of the Community
regarding directives only excludes the establishment of sanctions, as long as the
directive has a legal basis. With other words: the lacking competence of the
Community does not cover the whole criminal law but only the sanctions.114
Some authors dispute this. They claim that a detailed description of the actus reus
would create de facto a criminal competence, which the Community does not
posses.115 But this is a question, which cannot be answered abstractly. It has to
be decided for each individual case. The principle of proportionality can thereby
be used as a guiding principle, whereby the burden of the Member States has to
be as slight as possible.
It should be noted that certain norms and standards for directives are established.
As the Greek Maize case116 showed, the principle of assimilation and
effectiveness bind the Member States in their implementation of the directive. The
national courts have the duty to apply national legislation, especially implementing
legislation, in the light of the relevant directives. The interpretation rule also applies
in an anticipatory way, that is, also before expiry of the time limit for
implementation a directive,117 but following the case law of the ECJ this duty is
limited by the general principles of legal certainty and non-retroactivity.118
This system is facing the problem that, since the directive is only binding as to the
result to be achieved, but leaves to the national authorities the choice of form and
method, Member States transplant their duty in different ways and with different
intensity. Various authors assume that there are great differences in the maximum
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punishments and in the infliction of punishments.119 A reason for that is that the
amount of the penalty is basically co-determined by the rules of the substantive
part of criminal law of the Member States. This general part is quite different from
State to State and therefore leads to different sentences.120
3.5 Former attempts for harmonisation
In the past, there have been attempts to harmonise the criminal law of Member
States in certain areas. If these had been successful, it would have led to the
existence of Community criminal law.
Efforts of internationalisation of criminal law appeared mainly after the Second
World War and their starting point was the ECHR. Other important conventions
of the Council of Europe121 as well as international conventions in general,
especially in modern times of international crime and globalisation also belong to
the same field, while a form of internationalisation of criminal law is finally the
recent establishment of the Permanent International Criminal Court.122
In 1962 a working party of government representatives was formed, which was
to study the matter at hand. Its task was to set out ways to provide for better
harmonisation of criminal law provisions in connection with the EEC, particularly
regarding fraud against the Communities. The topics were: investigation and
prosecution of Community law, the position of EC personnel in criminal
proceedings, and national sanctions for the enforcement of Community law. The
focus of attention was the combat of fraud caused by loopholes in EEC
legislation, especially fraud at the expense of the EEC budget. The work stopped
when France left the working party in 1966, thereby blocking the draft treaty.123
The main reason for France’s withdrawal was the proposal to allow prosecution
and the execution of penal sentences in another Member State. In private law,
there exists a regulation on jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of
judgements in civil and commercial matter.124
In 1972 a new working group set to work. The need for a solution had not
diminished. Two draft treaties were submitted to the Council in 1976. One
concerned the criminal liability of EC civil servants; the other was a “Eurocrimes“
proposal, concerning protection by criminal law of the EC`s financial interests,
and the prosecution of violations of Community law.
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The European Parliament has continually taken an active interest in the
Community law/criminal law relationship. On behalf of the Legal Committee of the
European Parliament a Report was presented, which dealt with legal aspects of
this relationship. Following this report a resolution was passed, in which the
European Parliament declared its support for the draft treaties presented and
urged the Commission to carry out further research in to problem areas, such as
the criminal liability of legal entities in Member States.125 The European Parliament
requested for a list of national implementing provisions, which include sanctions
for violations of Community law. Since then, not much has been heard of this list
or the other items. Maybe because this could be considered as a task of
Sisyphus, for research would have to be done in all Member States into the
implementation of hundreds (thousands?) of directives and regulations.126
The draft treaties were drawn back127, but the Intergovernmental Conference on
European Political Union in Maastricht has resulted in the creation of a specific
legal basis in the Treaty text, in particular in Art.209a (now Art.280 ECT),128
which provides for the protection of the financial interests of the Community.
In the field of police and judicial co-operation, there was a developing body of
activity that anticipated the EU 3rd pillar: the so called TREVI process, set up in
1976 to facilitate European police co-operation against terrorist violence, leading
eventually to the emergence of Europol and the Schengen regime of co-operation
as regards border controls constructed by a number of EC states. The thrust of
such developments was then swept into the new 3rd pillar range of activities
established by the TEU, enabling the formulation of policy and the adoption of
conventions on a range of European criminal law matters coming under the broad
umbrella of “justice and home affairs“.129
In this connection even the set up of UCLAF and OLAF as (anti-) fraud unit can
be mentioned.130 The budget has set aside money for the combat of fraud.
A quite substantive proposal for a “model penal code for Europe“, dating from
1971, died an early death even within the Council of Europe.
The observed process of harmonisation of criminal law in the EU differs from
other relevant efforts, as for example in the Council of Europe. This is so, because
it takes place in the frame of a constructed supranational organisation. The
harmonisation-process has first of all different objects of reference. Here, one is
interested not only in international forms of criminality, but also- or rather mainly-
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in the protection of special legal goods of the EU itself as a supranational
organisation. On the other hand, the process of harmonisation of criminal law in
the EU takes place with different legal instruments on the grounds of the relevant
possibilities that the Union has from its constitutional treaties, and especially from
the Treaty of Amsterdam in the 3rd pillar. Finally, the harmonisation-process in
the field of criminal law is being advanced in practice within the EU with common
cooperation networks of penal repression, as for example Europol.131
3.6 Current changes in the Treaty of Amsterdam
3.6.1 Framework decisions
The Treaty of Amsterdam has redefined the 3rd pillar. Although criminal law co-
operation remains intergovernmental in nature, it contains now norms, Art.29 II
No.3 and Art.31 e TEU, which provide for an approximation of rules for criminal
matters in the Member States, including the possibility to establish minimum rules.
The procedure, which has to be used for that approximation, is regulated in
Art.34 II TEU. Particularly interesting are the framework decisions, introduced by
Art.34 II b TEU. This new type of Council acts, which is placed somewhere in
the middle between conventions and directives is expected to bring a significant
advancement in harmonisation procedures for criminal law in the EU in
comparison to the classical instruments of the conventions.132
One framework decision, that is already adopted, is the Framework Decision on
Criminal protection against fraudulently or other unfair anti-competitive conduct in
relation to the award of public contracts in the common market.133
These rules show a new development. Already in the approximation of rules for
criminal matters, a revaluation of this field compared to earlier can be observed.
The old TEU did not consider criminal law at all. This development walks along
with a simplification of the procedure, which applies first of all to framework
decisions. Before the Treaty of Amsterdam one would have needed a convention
with all its problems which are stated above. Furthermore, since a framework
decision shall only be binding upon the Member States as to the result to be
achieved but shall leave the national authorities the choice of form and method,
this might encourage the readiness of its conclusion. Compared to directives,
framework decisions represent a less drastic instrument because they are placed
in the 3rd pillar and follow therefore international, not Community rules. The
limitations of Member States sovereignty are therefore smaller.134
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3.6.2 Art.280 IV ECT
The Treaty of Amsterdam has for the first time established a competence for the
Council to adopt the necessary measures in the field of the prevention of and fight
against fraud affecting the financial interests of the Community. The areas covered
by Art.280 ECT fall into two categories: external and internal measures. The
former concerns the fight against fraud affecting the financial interests of the
Community in the Member States; the latter concerns the same kind of fraud
within the Community institutions, bodies and agencies.135
The question is if Art.280 IV ECT136 covers only sanctions with administrative
character or if the EC may act within the penal field as well now.
Some authors claim that Art.280 IV ECT only allows the use of non-penal
sanctions.137 They use as their main argument Art.280 IV (2) ECT. They argue
that the final clause was inserted in the Article for the very purpose of making it
plain that the Article was not meant to confer upon the Community any power to
enact criminal law, which did not previously exist. Art.280 IV could only be used
to introduce supplementary measures, which did not concern the application of
national criminal law or the national administration of justice.138 They consider
Art.280 IV ECT as the final statement that the Community has a competence
regarding administrative sanctions.139 Furthermore they emphasise that it should
not be forgotten, that historically there has been no intention of the Member
States to concede criminal power to the Community.140
The opposite opinion claims that Art.280 IV ECT grants the Community a partly
criminal law competence, which would apply on a complementary basis.141 Their
arguments are based on different aspects. First of all, one knows well the
technique, used in Community regulations, of stating expressly for the attention of
the legislator that a measure does not have to be a “criminal law“ measure. Those
who drafted Art.280 ECT knew this language and this technique.  Equally
revealing is the terminology used in Art.280 IV ECT, which refers not to the
existence of national law, but to its application. It is known that it is usually the
primacy of EC law, which makes national law inapplicable. Guaranteeing the
application of national criminal law presupposes therefore that there exists, and
that there could exist in the future, Community legislation that could hinder national
law.142
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Additionally, one could focus even closer on the wording. First, the mention of
“national“ penal law presupposes that there is going to be also another kind of
penal law which is not national, namely that there is going to be also a Community
penal law. Secondly, according to the wording, the measures to be taken by the
Council shall not concern the application of national criminal law; but it is obvious
that measures, which have no penal character, could not interfere with the national
criminal law. Consequently, the measures to be taken by the Council may also
include penal measures. Thirdly, it is unlikely that the national administration of
justice would possibly be affected by the measures to be taken by the Council if
these measures were not of a penal character.143
There is also a systematic argument. The first sentence of Art.280 IV ECT
requires the Council to guarantee an effective and equivalent protection of
financial interests of the EC and the necessary measures for the prevention and
fight against Community fraud includes criminal measures, in accordance with the
terminology and the system followed by the Treaty. When Art.280 II ECT
mentions “measures“ to fight fraud at the national level, there is no doubt that this
expression relates to and is meant to include (national) criminal law.144 It would
therefore be strange if the same expression (“measures“), mentioned again in
Art.280 IV(1) ECT, a priori excluded every criminal measure.145
There can also be raised a teleological argument for such a complementary
Community power. How else could the Council guarantee an effective and
equivalent fight against fraud in and by the Member States - the latter’s
administration of criminal justice being responsible for the application of criminal
laws and, as the case may be, of Community regulations?146
As a result of the variety of arguments, the second opinion seems convincing. This
shows that we have moved from a situation where the protection of the financial
interests of the Community was an extra-Communitarian issue and was only
within the domain of the Member States to a situation where, for the first time, the
Community has an active role to play in this protection.147
3.6.3 Directive
The new directive148 on the criminal law protection of the Community’s financial
interests is based on the line of thought that Art.280 IV ECT grants a criminal
competence to the Community. This is expressly stated in the Explanatory
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Memorandum149 of the directive by underlining that “Art.280 IV ECT covers all
measures in the area of preventing and curbing fraud. It is in this context that the
second sentence specifies exceptions to this, so given the general purpose of the
article, the second sentence can but be interpreted narrowly. The wording and the
legal context of the article do not preclude the adoption of measures setting
certain harmonisation objectives of a criminal type, provided that they do not
concern the application of national criminal law or the national administration of
justice.“
The Explanatory Memorandum further emphasises that the advantage of an act
adopted on the basis of Art.280 ECT is that it affords the benefits that go with the
1st pillar Community legislation. Community law offers supervisory mechanisms
not available under the 3rd pillar, namely the power conferred on the
Commission, as guardian of the Treaties, and the powers of the ECJ in this
context.
After a first chapter lining out the purpose and some general definitions, Chapter
II of the directive goes on to specify the conduct that damages the financial
interests of the Community, namely fraud, active and passive corruption, with
certain provisions on equal treatment, and money laundering, and requires
Member States to make criminal offences of such conduct. Chapters III and IV
contain provisions on liability and penalties, including for bodies corporate.
Chapter V contains provisions on co-operation of national authorities with the
Commission and the final provisions.
3.7 Conclusion
The discussion if a European Criminal Law is desirable is surpassed by the actual
development. Generally there exists a tendency towards a closer connection
between EC law and criminal law. The work with criminal law is getting more
offensive.150 We are on the road towards a European criminal law space and
cannot turn around.
It is now possible to talk in terms of an emergent “European criminal law space“,
although its structure is fragmented, complex and not especially visible. There is a
largely cohesive and in some sense merged Council of Europe/EU/EC multilateral
system in existence. This, cumulatively, supplies the framework for the emergent
(though as yet not very high profile) “European criminal law space“, but the fact
that the “European Criminal Law“ is not quite homogeneous causes problems
with fundamental principles of criminal law, namely with transparency and legal
certainty.
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4 Is harmonization necessary?
4.1 pro
Some authors claim that the global challenges of international criminality cannot be
played a lone hand by national authorities, but has to be answered by co-
operation. The arising information- and risk-society supports the present tendency
that criminal systems in Europe grow together. The distribution of legislative action
on central and de-central organs, the mutual influence of these systems as well as
the co-ordination of the executive powers using these rules are closely connected.
Historical, political, economic and cultural aspects influence the development of
these factors. Out of this results the need for standardisation or even
harmonisation.151
If the criminality is not bound to national borders any more, then the official
reaction may not be particularistic either. Oasis without or very mild criminal
sanctions allure criminal tourism. Harmonised criminal law would solve that
problem.152 Gaps in the legal protection and the control of criminality demand
European standards and instruments as well as democratic needs, which are
expressed in the protection of human rights.153
In spite of the greater uniformity resulting from the case law of the ECJ, the
disparities remain large between countries in areas as important as, for example,
the burden of proof, the degree of certainty required for a conviction, the
admissibility of written evidence or of previous statements made by the defendant,
and the extent of the right to silence. It is sometimes essential to produce evidence
collected in one Member State before the legal authorities of another; but at
present, there is no general rule to determine the conditions for the admissibility of
this evidence. Without aspiring to harmonise national laws completely, mutual
recognition of the admissibility of evidence is indispensable.154
The aim, as it is stated in Art.29 TEU, to provide the citizens with a high level of
safety within an area of freedom, security and justice is interpreted by some
authors as pointing towards unification.155
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4.2 contra
One could claim that the aim of fighting transnational criminality could be reached
easier, namely through an advanced co-operation on the basis of acceptance of
differences between the national laws, thus through confident co-operation of the
Member States on a basis of respect for national traditions.156 On the other hand,
as was pointed out already above157, there is a political stagnation of a process
which, by adding protocols to conventions which are signed but not ratified,
consists of building a paper wall against a problem of crime which is very real and
is expanding rapidly.
Partial tries for harmonisation bears some risks. First, there can be mentioned that
harmonisation could lead to a large number of rules which could make the legal
finding more complex158, even though the aim of harmonisation should be to make
everything less complicated. Then, from a realistic viewpoint, it has to be stated
that harmonised criminal law would not lead automatically to a common
application of the law. Especially if harmonisation only takes place in the special
part of the law, the substantive part stays applicable and keeps up the differences
between the Member States. The solution to these problems could lie in a
supranational instance of appeal.
Furthermore there is a risk that the agreement will be reduced to the smallest
common denominator. This would include the danger that entrenched guarantees
would get lost. Apart from that, partial harmonisation could lead to a stronger
protection of supranational objects of legal protection, which would lead to a loss
of coherence in the national legal order.159
As the main argument, the sceptic towards harmonisation claims that the penal
code of a state expresses the national and cultural peculiarities. There is no
homogeneous European opinion of what constitutes the right, rational and socially
reasonable criminal policy. Some of the countries trust in a harsh criminal policy
more than others. Only criminal codes, which had been grown out of national
tradition, could find the necessary acceptance.160 To keep up the national identity
is the main cause against harmonisation.
On the other hand, it should not be overseen that there is quite some dispute
about the question, which rules bear the culture of a state. Some think, it is the
rules of the substantive part of criminal law because a lot of special laws are
similar in different states. Other sees the similarities in the substantive part and
argues that the special part of the criminal rules expresses the national and cultural
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peculiarities.161 This surprising discord raises doubts regarding the thesis, that
criminal law is a characteristic product of a special culture.
4.3 different approaches
4.3.1 more intensive cooperation
It is not unrealistic to foresee further development in inter-state co-operation at
the European level and the logical end of this process would include: an obligation
of assistance, with little scope for discretion, and the disappearance of traditional
exceptions, such as those based on military and fiscal considerations; the
possibility of states extraditing their own nationals; developments in the field of
mutual assistance; and, as mutual trust and understanding grow, transfer of
proceedings and the execution of sentences may become the rule rather than the
exception. All of this would imply a considerable simplification of procedure.162
On the other hand, the weaknesses of co-operation where shown already
above.163
4.3.2 Assimilation
The assimilation principle means that the Member States` national laws on
infringements, the intent or result of which is unlawful curtailment of government
revenue or unlawfully acquired payments in the form of subsidies, refunds or
financial support, also apply to unlawful curtailment of the revenue of Community
Institutions or unlawful receipt of payments from these Institutions. The same
applies to submitting false documents or making false declarations with the intent
to curtail revenue or receive payment.
Assimilation is no synonym for harmonisation. The latter would mean uniform
offences and criminal sanctions in the Member States.164
The principle of assimilation, taken up in 1989 in the Greek maize case165 on the
basis of Art.10 ECT, is now enshrined in Art.280 II ECT: “Member States shall
take the same measures to counter fraud affecting the financial interests of the
Community as they take to counter fraud affecting their own financial interests“.
It should be noted that, while the principle of assimilation has the advantage of
simplicity in its formulation and its implementation, it does not guarantee
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effectiveness in criminal justice. Assimilation is not able to solve the problem of
cross-border criminality. The report drawn up by the Commission in November
1995 on the application of Art.209 A (now Art.280 ECT) concluded that in the
future in certain areas, improvement on the assimilation option will only be able to
be made by harmonising national practice more closely at the Community level.
This means that, in addition to the assimilation option, the options for co-
operation and harmonisation through closer integration of national practices must
also be explored.166
4.3.3 Corpus Juris proposal
The Corpus Juris was initiated by the Xxth Direction of the European
Commission for the protection of the Union financial interests. A group of eight
academic lawyers from different Member States were asked to produce
proposals, which would deal with the problem of EU budgetary fraud. The aim of
this draft, that has already been amended once,167 was to constitute a basic
instrument of penal repression within the EU, even for the limited field of its
financial interests initially.168 For the first time, the judicial jurisdiction of the EU
would not only be that of supreme authority to whom national courts defer when
seeking interpreted legal guidance. The EU would become the actual, and single,
prosecuting authority in cases of suspected budget fraud, with the right, through its
agents, both to conduct investigations into its suspicions and conduct trials within
all member countries according to its own rules of law as described in the Corpus
Juris.169
It should be observed that it was declared the thin end of the wedge, for as the
seminar programmes states, it was conceived as an embryo of a future European
criminal code.170
The Corpus Juris is divided into two parts. Part I set out certain acts of fraud,
corruption, market rigging and money laundering that would become criminal
offences throughout a single legal area of the EU. Part II deals with procedure
and evidence and would create an EPP responsible for the investigation and
prosecution of fraud on the EU budget.171
A problem the Corpus Juris is facing is that there would exist two different justice
systems in force inside the same jurisdiction. These two systems are far from
being homogeneous, as they are based on different ideologies and different
opinions of what a rational criminal policy is like.
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With the adoption of the above-mentioned directive172, the Corpus Juris proposal
died, except the discussions around an EPP.
4.3.4 A Model Penal Code
The idea of a Model Penal Code was first introduced in 1971 in the Council of
Europe but the result of the discussion was negative. No advantage could be
found in the harmonisation of criminal law as such. 22 years later the idea came
up again.173 It should solve the problem of the increasing freedom of movement
for criminals but still closed borders for the prosecution. The promoters of the
Model Penal Code see the only way out from the problems caused by the
European integration through even further integration.
A Model Penal Code would represent an idea covering the whole substantive
criminal law. It is not thought to be binding. Flexible deviations from the model are
allowed. Its aim is to offer an orientation.174 A Model Penal Code can
recommend minimum standards and leave space for further supplementary rules.
Furthermore it could contain a “maximum list“ to avoid over-criminalization. So
while the Corpus Juris strives after harmonisation, a  Model Penal Code would
only offer orientation.175
Since a model penal code is normally not binding, it is much easier to agree on it.
The national legislator has the possibility to deviate from the model rules, for
example to keep national particularities. On the other hand, because of its
flexibility the harmonising effect is much smaller than the one of binding
conventions or EC directives; but model rules can still have quite a harmonising
effect because the development of a Model Penal Code would create a better
understanding for other national legal systems.176 The creation of a Model Penal
Code can be seen as a “soft“ way of harmonisation.
Here again exists the risk that the Member States only agree on a dogmatic
minimum program and that the program, on which it is politically easiest to agree-
the program of strengthened repression-, would keep the upper hand.177
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4.4 Legal basis for harmonization
A rule to remember is set out in Art.5 ECT according to which the Community
possesses only the power conferred upon it by the Treaty and, moreover, that for
powers thus conferred relating to areas which do not fall within its exclusive
competence, the Community must respect the principle of subsidiarity. This means
that for any Community action the institution concerned must be able to point to a
specific legal basis to support its action, and moreover be able to justify, when it
has no exclusive power, that the action proposed cannot be better achieved by
the Member States.
4.4.1 Art.280 IV ECT
Art.280 IV ECT cannot provide the proper legal basis for a harmonisation of
criminal law because the field it covers is not wide enough. It can only be used in
the framework of the Community’s financial interests.
4.4.2 Art.95 ECT
It should be considered further, if Art.95 ECT could be used. It was proposed as
a legal basis regarding the protection of the financial interests of the Community.
Then the measures should have as their object the establishment and functioning
of the internal market within the meaning of Art.95 ECT; but even if it seems clear
that the Community budget is essential for the continued existence of the
Community, and that the Community is essential to ensure the continued existence
of the internal market, case law holds that this is not to be used to legislate on
matters which are really only ancillary to the functioning of the single market.178 If
Art.95 ECT cannot provide a proper legal basis for protectionary rules of the
financial interests of the EC, it definitely cannot provide the sound legal basis for
harmonisation of criminal law in general.
4.4.3 Art.308 ECT
Nor could a competence be based upon Art.308 ECT as a necessarily
supplementary engagement of the Community fulfilling the goals of the common
market according to the implied power theory, which has been developed from
the ECJ. Although it looks like a “catch-all“ provision, it is generally taken as only
enabling the Community to enact legislation falling within the broad outlines of the
powers of the Community as conferred by other articles. The activity of the
Community within the frame of Art.308 ECT presupposes a field, for which the
Community has already been competent.179
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4.4.4 Art.34 (2d) / Art.40 TEU
Since criminal law is, following these considerations, not covered by the ECT yet
(except the new directive), I consider the 3rd pillar as the right framework to look
for a legal basis to harmonise criminal law.
In order to bring a draft like the C.J. or any other similar proposition for
harmonisation in force, the way to be followed could be the procedure of Art.34
(2d) TEU, namely the recommendation of a convention established by the
Council, which the Member States would have, then, to adopt according to their
respective constitutional requirements.180 An alternative as a valid legal basis for
such a far-reaching criminal reform could be found in Art.40 TEU that would
permit some Member States to establish a closer form of co-operation in the field
of combating transborder crimes.
4.5 Conclusion
The question is if improved crime prevention, increased risk of getting caught, and
international police co-operation and development of court procedures could be
more effective strategies, than new criminal codes in combating crimes. But it
cannot be denied that most tries aiming in that direction were not really successful.
The free movement of people, capital and services within the European Union has
made it necessary to create a “European legal space“ in criminal justice, in which
the decisions of the criminal courts of one Member State are automatically
recognised in another, and in which certain universal rules apply- particularly
about obtaining and using evidence. Harmonisation may thereby well be a
worthwhile goal in some areas, and it may be argued that in that covered by the
ECHR it should be accepted as a matter of principle.
In the end it all comes down to the right balancing of controversial principles:
efficiency and the rule that criminal law is the ultimate ratio, simplicity and variety,
unification and protection of cultural differences.
Criminal law may not be used as the driving force to achieve political unification;
criminal law should rather be the outcome of such unification.
It can be argued that it is a good idea to try harmonisation in the area of
Community fraud- as it happened through the directive. This can be considered as
a pilot project. Following that, gradually the jurisprudence and the legal
academics could develop a substantive part for criminal law.
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5 Future Perspective: A European
Public Prosecuter?
5.1 Traditions
In Europe we face two completely different legal traditions regarding prosecution.
On one side, an accusatorial tradition, which allows private prosecution and
structures prosecution as a duel between two parties (the prosecution and the
defence) carried out before an impartial and neutral judge, who does not
participate in an active manner in the search for evidence. The only job of the
prosecutor is to prosecute using the evidence the police gave him.181
The other tradition is inquisitorial, relying on the active search for truth by the
authorities representing the state and having responsibility for the investigation. In
practise, the power of investigation is shared between the Public Prosecutor and
the judge. This judge acts not only as an investigator but is also responsible for
certain judicial decisions (including, eventually, remands in custody and
supervision orders).
The two different procedural models have the same fundamental objectives: to
find the truth, to punish the guilty, and not to impact adversely on the innocent.
Both models have evolved in time and their original features have become
overlaid. The 15 national criminal justice systems are increasingly converging,
thereby weakening the traditional opposition between the Anglo-Saxon and
continental policing models. The central direction that seemed to be the key-
characteristic of most continental systems has become more diffuse due to a
growing emphasis on locally and regionally determined intervention, while the
Anglo-Saxon system of Community policing has been challenged by the repeated
creation of new central structures.182 This evolution was partly spontaneous and
partly because the 15 EU Member States are members to the Council of Europe,
under whose auspices the ECHR and the jurisprudence of the ECHR developed
guarantees of fair trial.183 The result of this evolution is that the national systems in
force in Europe have become more compatible than they were previously.
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5.2 Green book
The directive184 alone cannot be the solution for the problems of transnational
criminality regarding the financial interests of the Community. The prosecution is
still bound to the national borders. Therefore worked the Commission on the
thought of an EPP and presented a green book, discussing this idea. It was first
brought up in the Corpus Juris proposal, which was mentioned before, to be set
out in a new Art.280a.
Right now, the situation can be described as follows: OLAF carries out the
preparatory stage of internal investigations within the Community institutions.
When those investigations let appear acts which may give rise to criminal liability,
OLAF must transfer the investigation for those aspects of the file to the judicial
authorities of the Member States where the Community institution involved is
located. Such authorities will then be confronted with the immunity of persons and
premises pertaining to the Community and will have to apply for permission from
the Community to carry out hearings, seizures, on-the-spot investigations and the
like.185
Furthermore, fraud committed at a supranational level posses unique problems for
prosecutors at a national level where elements of the crime are committed in
various Member States and where no national authority has complete jurisdiction,
either to investigate or prosecute the fraud and recover funds. A major obstacle is
the lack of common standards of evidence, which prevents Member States from
accepting evidence gathered in other Member States. Evidence must be sought
by commission rogatory (which means that each Contracting State shall request
from any other Contracting State to undertake in its territory rogatory action with
respect to any judicial procedures186), a process which is usually slow and often
completely ineffective.187 The sharing of information is difficult between law
enforcement authorities, local and national police forces do not cooperate
effectively enough to enable them to catch organised criminals from the other side
of national frontiers.188
This situation is already beginning to be solved with the Amsterdam Treaties and
in trying to make the EU into an area of freedom, security and justice. Cross-
border co-operation has increased considerably in the last ten years. The tasks
and powers of Europol have been increased; OLAF and the EJN have been set
up. But much more still needs to be done.
Therefore it is proposed to turn over those matters to an EPP. The EPP would be
based on the principle of European territoriality: in the preparatory stage prior to a
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ruling (investigation and prosecution), the largely decentralised EPP would enjoy
identical powers in the fifteen countries of the Union (directing investigations,
overseeing judicial procedures), while offences committed anywhere on Union
territory would elicit the same responses. The EPP would be independent of both
national authorities and Community institutions would have a relatively low-key
central structure and would enlist the services of delegated European prosecutors
(selected by each Member State from among its national prosecutors). He would
be authorised to take up cases on his own initiative and would be required to
investigate all substantive evidence.189 An EPP would be focused on fraud on the
Community budget whomever it was committed by.
Politically, is seems obvious that the main obstacle to the creation of a EPP is the
fact that national authorities would lose a part of their autonomy with regard to the
beginning, conduct and conclusion of criminal prosecutions. It would knock a
dent in the national sovereignty of the Member States, even though the dent the
EPP would make would be minimal, because he would deal with only a small
minority of cases.190
At the legal level, the main obstacle to the creation of a European Public
Prosecutor stems for the separation of European legal systems into two
completely different traditions. Furthermore it has to be remembered, that the
EPP would only work within the Community; but elements of the offence may
occur in third states, both in cases of subsidy fraud and customs fraud. Witnesses,
evidence and assets may be situated outside the Union. The EPP would not be
able to request mutual assistance from countries outside the European Union.
On the other hand, attention must be drawn to the problems of co-operation,
which were stated above.191 None of the European judicial co-operation
instruments is as yet operational, whilst fraud is gaining ground and criminal
networks are increasingly organised. Furthermore these instruments are not
adapted to fight against organised crime. They were meant to combat individual
fraud. Under these conditions, a solution must be sought at the Community level,
focusing on vertical co-operation. The creation of a European “judicial“ space
presupposes the participation of “judicial“ authorities.192 The establishment of an
EPP would enable solutions to be found, at least in part, to the problems of
jurisdiction, of offences constituting a crime in the country seeking extradition and
in the country holding the accused and of delay. The energies and resources of
prosecutors must be united, not dispersed, when they have to cope with highly
organised crime.193
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Another aspect should not be forgotten when thinking about closer co-operation
or even the creation of an EPP. Increased international co-operation between
authorities tends to disturb the fragile balance between prosecution and defence in
a criminal case. In this respect, the accused will have to acquire his own rights to
co-operation, to the extent necessary for his defence (for instance, the right to
compel the attendance of witnesses from abroad). The logical end here would be
a situation in which national borders are no longer obstacles for the defence in a
criminal case either.194
The creation of an EPP would imply an amendment of the ECT. Such an
amendment would have to be ratified by each of the Member States according to
the procedure required by the Treaties.
5.3 Alternative solution: Eurojust
The European Council held a special meeting on 15 and 16 October 1999 in
Tampere on the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice in the
European Union.195
As a result of the fact that criminals must find no way of exploiting differences in
the judicial systems of Member States, it was proposed that a unit “Eurojust“
should be established. On 19 July 2000 the Council of the European Union
decided to set up Eurojust.196 It was finally created on 6 December 2001.197 It is
composed of national prosecutors, magistrates or police officers of equivalent
competence, detached from each Member State according to its legal system.
They will at the same time continue as members of the national organisation from
which they come.
Eurojust has the task of facilitating the proper co-ordination of national
prosecuting authorities and of supporting criminal investigations in organised crime
cases, notably based on Europol`s analysis, as well as co-operating closely with
the EJN.198 The EJN is a decentralised network between EU lawyers and judges
working on criminal cases and tries to help them exchange information rapidly and
effectively, whereas Eurojust is a central unit. It will increase, speed up and
improve judicial co-operation- the co-operation between legal systems and
national courts that enables criminals to be caught and tried quickly, fairly and
efficiently in cross-border cases. It will be able to give immediate legal advice and
assistance in cross-border cases to the investigators, prosecutors and judges in
different Member States. It will also handle letters rogatory.199 Eurojust will be,
above all, an instrument to reinforce the co-operation between the judges and the
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prosecutors of each Member State in order to guarantee the rights and freedom
of the European citizens as a whole.200
Art.2 (2) of the Council decision expresses that „it shall be the task of the liaison
officers at Eurojust:
(a) to provide investigating authorities of other Member States as well as the
Commission of the EC and Europol with information on relevant substantive and
procedural law of the State from which they have detached or indicate an
appropriate body for such information,
(b) subject to the law of their State of dispatch, to provide judicial authorities and
other authorities responsible for criminal investigations as well as the Commission
and Europol with information on the position regarding investigations and any
judgements in criminal matters or arrange contacts with the investigating body in
their State of dispatch,
(c) in cases where investigations are in progress in two or more Member States
into offences which are connected, to provide support for the co-ordination and
conduct of joint investigations,
(d) to provide legal advice in support of Europol`s work of analysis if so
requested,
(e) in further treaty negotiations on extending the powers of Europol, to deliver
expert opinions in judicial support of Europol if so requested,
(f) to exchange experience of weak points in the cross-border combating of crime
and the combating of criminal offences against the financial interests of the Union.“
Furthermore, Art.5 (1) obliges Eurojust to update continuously the documentation
on currently applicable legal instruments issued by the European Judicial Network
and supplement it with indications regarding the treatment of problem cases in
judicial legal assistance and particular procedural provisions of the Member
States.
In view of the multitude of treaties and protocols which are also to be applied in
the future, together with their differing degrees of declarations and reservations,
national problems of competence, the requirement to produce the necessary
judicial/public prosecutor’s decisions rapidly, increasingly frequent occurrence of
conflicts of jurisdiction precisely in the area of organised crime and not least in
view of the documentation and language difficulties, there is a need for a legal
documentation and clearing agency (Eurojust) corresponding to Europol and
tailored to judicial requirements. This agency will exist alongside Europol and
would also cooperate with Europol.201
Eurojust marks a further qualitative step in closer judicial co-operation and goes
beyond the current and potential work of the European Judicial Network.
Establishing a central round table of liaison officers and magistrates will probably
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have a certain added value. It will be easier to communicate within a team
working in a joint office than among decentralised contact points in the Member
States, even in the light of improved technical means of communication. A central
office can also increase cost-efficiency, facilitate the building up of a collation of
relevant documents and guarantee that specialists with expertise in judicial co-
operation are available at any time.202
In the Commission’s opinion, Eurojust should be more than a documentation and
information centre providing advice on abstract level. This unit should be involved
in individual criminal investigations. It could track down and reveal a possible
hidden correlation between cases and investigations, which often cannot be easily
identified at the national level.203 This would point in the direction of an EPP.
5.4 Conclusion
One may presume that establishing Eurojust is a step in the right direction without
getting too far. A specific judicial liaison office would at the same time constitute a
starting-point for the separation of powers in Europe, without obliging States to
cede sovereignty at a point where they are (still) unable and/or unwilling to do so
with regard to pan-European co-operation. But with regard to the problems of
transborder crime, which the Community is facing now, it can be considered as
not avoidable that the EC is heading towards an EPP.
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Supplement A
ART.280 IV
THE COUNCIL, ACTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROCEDURE
REFERRED TO IN ART 251, AFTER CONSULTING TH ECOURT OF
AUDITORS, SHALL ADOPT THE NECESSARY MEASURES IN THE
FIELDS OF THE PREVENTION OF A FIGHT AGAINST FRAUD
AFFECTING THE FINANCIAL INTERESTS OF THE COMMUNITY
WITH A VIEW TO AFFORDING EFFECTIVE AND EQUIVALENT
PROTECTION IN THE MEMBER STATES. THESE MEASURES SHALL
NOT CONCERN THE APPLICATION OF NATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
OR THE NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
2001/0115 (COD)
PROPOSAL FOR A DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
AND OF THE COUNCIL ON THE CRIMINAL-LAW PROTECTION
OF THE COMMUNITY'S FINANCIAL INTERESTS
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in
particular Article 280(4) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, [12]
[12] OJ C
Having regard to the opinion of the Court of Auditors, [13]
[13] OJ C
Acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 of the Treaty,
Whereas:
(1) The institutions and the Member States attach great importance to the
protection of the Community's financial interests and to the fight against fraud and
any other illegal activities that damage Community financial interests. The
protection of the Community's financial interests concerns not only the
management of budget appropriations, but extends to all measures affecting or
liable to affect its assets. All available means must be deployed to fully attain these
objectives, in view of the legislative power devolved to the Community level,
while maintaining the current distribution and balance of responsibilities between
the national and Community levels.
(2) Criminal law in the Member States needs to make an effective contribution to
protecting the Community's financial interests.
(3) The instruments laid down on the basis of Chapter VI of the Treaty on
European Union concerning the protection of the European Communities' financial
interests, namely the Convention of 26 July 1995 [14] and the Protocols of 27
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September 1996, [15] 29 November 1996 [16] and 19 June 1997, [17] contain
several provisions on closer alignment of criminal law in the Member States and
on improving cooperation between them. As these instruments have not been
ratified by all Member States, their entry into force continues to remain uncertain.
[14] OJ C 316, 27.11.1995, p.48.
[15] OJ C 313, 23.10.1996, p.1.
[16] OJ C 151, 20.5.1997, p.1.
[17] OJ C 195, 25.6.1997, p.1.
(4) Under Article 280 of the Treaty it is possible to include in a Community
legislative act any provisions of these instruments that do not concern the
application of national criminal law or the administration of justice in the Member
States.
(5) In many cases, fraud involving Community revenue and expenditure is not
restricted to a single country, but is often the work of organised criminal
networks.
(6) Since the Community's financial interests can be damaged or threatened by
acts of fraud, corruption or money laundering, common definitions of these types
of conduct need to be adopted in order to protect these interests.
(7) Changes need to be made, as appropriate, to national legislation to make
corruption involving Community officials or other Member States' civil servants a
criminal offence. As regards Community officials, these changes to national
legislation must not be restricted to acts of active and passive corruption, but must
also cover other offences affecting or liable to affect Community revenue or
expenditure, including offences committed by or directed towards people with
powers at the highest level.
(8) Acts of fraud, corruption and money laundering need to be made punishable
criminal offences. Member States determine the criminal penalties applicable to
offences under the national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive, without
prejudice to the imposition of other penalties in certain appropriate cases, and
make provision for custodial sentences, at least in cases of serious fraud. They
take whatever measures are required to ensure that these penalties are applied.
The penalties must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
(9) Businesses play an important role in areas financed by the Community and
people with decision-making power in businesses should not avoid criminal
liability in certain circumstances.
(10) The financial interests of the Community can be damaged or threatened by
acts committed in the name of bodies corporate.
(11) Changes need to be made, as appropriate, to national legislation, so that
bodies corporate can be held responsible for acts of fraud, active corruption and
money laundering committed in their name that damage or threaten to damage the
financial interests of the Community.
(12) Changes need to be made, as appropriate, to national legislation to make it
possible to confiscate the proceeds of acts of fraud, corruption and money
laundering.
(13) For the purpose of ensuring effective action against fraud, active and passive
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corruption and the money laundering that goes with them damaging or liable to
damage the Community's financial interests, there is a need to lay down measures
for cooperation between the Member States and the Commission. This
cooperation involves processing of personal data and in particular the exchange of
information between the Member States and the Commission and between the
Commission and non-member countries. This processing must comply with the
rules on the protection of personal data, notably Directive 95/46/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data [18] and Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community
institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data [19] and the
relevant rules concerning the confidentiality of judicial investigations.
[18] OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31.
[19] OJ L 8, 12.1.2001, p. 1.
(14) Those Member States who have yet to ratify the instruments laid down on
the basis of Chapter VI of the Treaty on European Union concerning the
protection of the European Communities' financial interests should do so
forthwith, so that the provisions not falling within the scope of Article 280(4) of
the Treaty (namely jurisdiction, judicial assistance, transfer and centralisation of
prosecutions, extradition and enforcement of judgments) can also enter into force.
(15) This act, which sets out to align national legislation as regards the criminal-
law protection of the Community's financial interests, respects the fundamental
rights and observes the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:
Chapter I Purpose and definitions
Article 1 Purpose
The purpose of this Directive is to bring the Member States' legislation closer
together as regards the criminal-law protection of the financial interests of the
Community.
Article 2 Definitions
For the purposes of this Directive:
1) 'official' shall mean any Community or national official, including any national
official of another Member State;
2) 'Community official' shall mean:
- any person who is an official or other contracted employee within the meaning
of the Staff Regulations of officials of the European Communities or the
Conditions of employment of other servants of the European Communities,
- any person seconded to the European Communities by the Member States or
by any public or private body who carries out functions equivalent to those
performed by European Community officials or other Community servants.
Members of bodies set up in accordance with the Treaties establishing the
European Communities and the staff of such bodies shall be treated as
46
Community officials, inasmuch as the Staff Regulations of Officials of the
European Communities or the Conditions of employment of other servants of the
European Communities do not apply to them;
3) 'national official' shall mean any person with the status of 'official' or 'public
officer' as defined in the national law of the Member State for the purposes of the
application of that Member State's criminal law.
Nevertheless, in the case of proceedings involving an official from one Member
State instituted by another Member State, the latter shall not be bound to apply
the definition of 'national official' except in so far as that definition is compatible
with its national law;
4) 'legal person' shall mean any entity having such status under the applicable
national law, except for States and other public bodies exercising state authority
and public international organisations.
Chapter II Offences
Article 3 Fraud
1. For the purposes of this Directive, fraud affecting the Community's financial
interests shall consist of:
(a) in respect of expenditure, any intentional act or omission relating to:
- the use or presentation of false, incorrect or incomplete statements or
documents, which has as its effect the misappropriation or wrongful retention of
funds from the general budget of the Community or budgets managed by, or on
behalf of, the Community,
- non-disclosure of information in violation of a specific obligation, with the same
effect,
- the misuse of such funds for purposes other than those for which they were
originally granted;
(b) in respect of revenue, any intentional act or omission relating to:
- the use or presentation of false, incorrect or incomplete statements or
documents, which has the effect of unlawfully reducing the resources of the
general budget of the Community or budgets managed by, or on behalf of, the
Community,
- non-disclosure of information in violation of a specific obligation, with the same
effect,
- misuse of a legally obtained benefit, with the same effect.
2. For the purposes of this Directive, serious fraud shall consist of any case of
fraud as defined in paragraph 1 and involving a minimum amount set in each
Member State. This minimum amount may not be more than 50 000 euros.
Article 4 Corruption
3. For the purposes of this Directive, passive corruption shall consist of the
deliberate act on the part of an official, whether directly or through an
intermediary, of requesting or receiving advantages of any kind whatsoever, for
themselves or for a third party, or accepting a promise of such an advantage, as
inducement to breach their official obligations and carry out or refrain from
carrying out an official duty or an act in the course of their official duties in a way
that damages or is likely to damage the Community's financial interests.
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4. For the purposes of this Directive, active corruption shall consist of the
deliberate act of promising or giving, directly or through an intermediary, an
advantage of any kind whatsoever to officials, for themselves or for a third party,
as inducement for them to breach their official obligations and carry out or refrain
from carrying out an official duty or an act in the course of their official duties in a
way that damages or is likely to damage the Community's financial interests.
Article 5 Equal treatment
1. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that in their
criminal law the descriptions of the offences constituting conduct of the type
referred to in Article 3 of this Directive where committed by their national officials
in the exercise of their duties apply in the same way where such offences are
committed by Community officials in the exercise of their duties.
2. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that in their
criminal law the descriptions of the offences referred to in paragraph 1 of this
Article and in Article 4 where committed by or in respect of their government
ministers, elected members of their parliamentary assemblies, members of their
highest courts or members of their national audit body in the exercise of their
functions apply in the same way where such offences are committed by or in
respect of members of the Commission of the European Communities, the
European Parliament, the Court of Justice or the Court of Auditors of the
European Communities in the exercise of their duties.
3. Where a Member State has enacted special legislation concerning acts or
omissions for which government ministers are responsible by reason of their
special political position in that Member State, paragraph 2 may not apply to such
legislation, provided that the Member State ensures that Members of the
Commission of the European Communities are also covered by the criminal
legislation implementing Article 4 and paragraph 1 of this Article.
4. This Directive shall apply without prejudice to the provisions on the lifting of the
immunities contained in the Treaty, the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities
of the European Communities, the Statutes of the Court of Justice and the texts
implementing them.
Article 6 Money laundering
1. For the purposes of this Directive 'money laundering' shall consist of the types
of conduct listed below involving the proceeds of fraud, at least in serious cases,
and of active and passive corruption as referred to in Articles 3 and 4, where
committed deliberately:
(a) the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived
from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such activity, for the
purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting
any persons involved in the commission of such activity to evade the legal
consequences of their action,
(b) the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition,
movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such
property is derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such
activity,
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(c) the acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt,
that such property was derived from criminal activity or from an act of
participation in such activity,
(d) participation in one of the acts listed in the three preceding indents and
association for the purpose of committing the act.
2. Money laundering shall be regarded as such even where the activities which
generated the property to be laundered were perpetrated in the territory of
another Member State or in that of a third country.
Article 7 Duty to criminalise
1. Member States shall take the necessary measures to transpose the provisions
of this Chapter into their national criminal law in such a way that the conduct
referred to therein constitutes criminal offences.
Member States shall take appropriate measures for the purpose of establishing,
on the basis of the objective factual circumstances, when such conduct is
deliberate.
2. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the intentional
preparation or supply of false, incorrect or incomplete statements or documents
having the effect of fraud as referred to in Article 3 constitutes a criminal offence if
it is not already punishable as a principal offence or as participation in, instigation
of, or attempted commission of such fraud.
Chapter III Liability
Article 8 Criminal liability of heads of businesses
Member States shall take the necessary measures to allow heads of businesses or
any persons having power to take decisions or exercise control within a business
to be declared criminally liable in accordance with the principles defined by their
national law in the event of conduct as referred to in Chapter II on the part of a
person under their authority acting on behalf of the business.
Article 9 Liability of bodies corporate
1. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that bodies
corporate can be held liable for fraud, active corruption and money laundering as
referred to in Chapter II and committed for their benefit by any person who has a
leading position within the body corporate, whether acting individually or as a
member of an organ of the body corporate, based on:
- a power of representation of the body corporate, or
- an authority to take decisions on behalf of the body corporate, or
- an authority to exercise control within the body corporate,
as well as for involvement as accessories or instigators in such fraud, active
corruption or money laundering or the attempted commission of such fraud.
2. Without prejudice to paragraph 1, Member States shall take the necessary
measures to ensure that a body corporate can be held liable where the lack of
supervision or control by a person referred to in paragraph 1 has made possible
the commission of an act of fraud, active corruption or money laundering for the
benefit of that body corporate by a person under its authority.
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3. Liability of a body corporate under paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not exclude
criminal proceedings against natural persons who are perpetrators, instigators or
accessories in the fraud, active corruption or money laundering.
Chapter IV Penalties
Article 10 Penalties on natural persons
Without prejudice to the provisions of the second paragraph, Member States
shall take the measures necessary to ensure that the conduct referred to in
Chapter II as well as involvement in such conduct as an accessory or instigator
and, with the exception of the conduct referred to in Article 4, the attempted
commission of acts involving such conduct are punishable by effective,
proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties, including, at least in cases
involving serious fraud, custodial sentences.
However, in cases of minor fraud involving a total amount of less than 4 000
euros and not involving particularly serious circumstances under its laws, a
Member State may provide for penalties of a different type from those laid down
in the first paragraph.
Article 11 Penalties on bodies corporate
1. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that a body
corporate held liable pursuant to Article 9(1) is punishable with effective,
proportionate and dissuasive penalties, which shall include criminal or non-
criminal fines and may include other penalties such as:
(a) exclusion from entitlement to public benefits or aid;
(b) temporary or permanent disqualification from engaging in business activities;
(c) placing under judicial supervision;
(d) a judicial winding-up order.
2. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that a body
corporate held liable pursuant to Article 9(2) is punishable by effective,
proportionate and dissuasive penalties or measures.
Article 12 Confiscation
Member States shall take the necessary measures to enable the seizure and,
without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties, the confiscation or
removal of the instruments and proceeds of the conduct referred to in Chapter II
or property the value of which corresponds to such proceeds. Any instruments,
proceeds or other property seized or confiscated shall be dealt with by the
Member State in accordance with its national law.
Chapter V Final provisions
Article 13 Cooperation with the European Commission
1. As part of the cooperation with the Commission on fighting fraud, corruption
and money laundering as referred to in Chapter II, Member States shall take the
necessary measures to enable the Commission to provide all the technical and
operational assistance required to facilitate the coordination of investigations
undertaken by the relevant national authorities.
2. Member States shall take the necessary measures to enable the relevant
authorities in their countries to exchange information with the Commission for the
purposes of facilitating the establishment of the facts and ensuring effective action
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against the conduct referred to in Chapter II. Such measures shall require the
Commission and the competent national authorities to take account, in each
specific case, of the requirements of confidentiality of investigations and protection
of personal data.
3. Any processing of personal data by the Commission and the Member States
pursuant to this Directive must be in compliance with Directive 95/46/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free moment
of such data and with Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with
regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and
bodies and on the free movement of such data.
4. In order to safeguard the confidentiality of judicial investigations and in
connection with the exchange of information under paragraphs 1 to 3:
(i) the Member State supplying information to the Commission is entitled to lay
down specific conditions for the use of such information by the Commission and
by any other Member State to which this information might be transmitted;
(ii) in the event of disclosure to any other Member State of personal data it has
obtained from a Member State, the Commission shall inform the Member State
which supplied this information of the disclosure;
(iii) before disclosing to a third country personal data which it has obtained from a
Member State, the Commission shall obtain an assurance that the Member State
which supplied the information has authorised this disclosure.
Article 14 Domestic law
Nothing in this Directive shall prevent Member States adopting or maintaining, in
the field covered by this Directive, more stringent provisions in their domestic law
for the purpose of effectively protecting the financial interests of the Community.
Article 15 Transposition
1. The Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and
administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive no later than 31
December 2001.
Such measures adopted by the Member States shall contain a reference to this
Directive or shall be accompanied by such reference when officially published.
The methods of making such reference shall be laid down by Member States.
2. Member States shall promptly communicate to the Commission the text of the
provisions of domestic law which they adopt in the field governed by this
Directive.
Article 16 Entry into force
This Directive shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its
publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities.
Article 17
This Directive is addressed to the Member States.
Done at Brussels, [...]
For the European Parliament For the Council
The President The President
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